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HARVARD LAW REVIEW

THE SOCIAL CONSEQUENCES OF COMMON
LAW RULES
Richard A. Epstein*
In the past decade, commentators applying both economic and
historical methods to the study of the classical common law have
explicitly or implicitly made sweeping claimsfor the system's ability
to allocate or redistribute substantial shares of wealth. In this
Article, Professor Epstein challenges the assumption that the fundamental doctrines of the common law can have a decisive effect
on the flow of resources in society. He calls attention to the constraints placed upon the system by the generality of its rules, the
prospectively indeterminate alignment of economically interested
parties, the expenses of adjudication, and the divergent social beliefs of the judiciary. He concludes that, while certain narrowly
focused common law rules may work major economic effects, most
interest groups would generally direct their attention to the legislative and administrative arenas, in which far greater gains and
losses are to be expected.

I.

T

THE THEME

he past generation of legal scholars has been preoccupied

with the social and economic consequences of common
law rules. One manifestation of this concern is found in the
work of the law and economics movement, which has repeatedly sought to demonstrate that certain common law rules
facilitate "efficient" resource use. 1 In a parallel development,
some legal historians have insisted that courts have shaped the
common law to promote or subsidize industrial growth and
development, and hence to advance the interests of certain
2
classes at the expense of others.
* Professor of Law, University of Chicago. Columbia University, A.B., 1964;
Oxford University, B.A., 1966; Yale University, LL.B., 1968. I gratefully acknowledge the helpful criticisms that Douglas G. Baird and Cass R. Sunstein made of an
earlier draft of this paper.
The best known statement of the thesis is in R. POSNER, ECONOic ANALYSIS
OF LAW (2d ed. 1977). For a more recent formulation, see Landes & Posner, The
Positive Economic Theory of Tort Law, 15 GA. L. REv. 851 (1981).
2 L. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 409-27 (1973); M. HoRWITZ,
THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1780-i86o, at 67-1o8 (1977); Gregory,
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Both of these arguments assume that a choice between
competing common law rules can have a significant effect on
the allocation of resources and the distribution of wealth in
society. This assumption often rests on the unstated premise
that the issues subject to frequent appellate litigation have an
institutional importance that equals their intellectual difficulty.
But this premise is deeply flawed. Even if these choices do in
theory redistribute wealth between social classes or encourage
efficient behavior, their actual social impact is minimal.
The central theme of this Article is that the intellectual and
institutional constraints on common law adjudication require
one to be very cautious in attributing major social and economic consequences to common law rules. Ironically, the doctrinal developments that are offered as proof of the importance
of common law adjudication often demonstrate, if anything,
quite the opposite. In my view, the prolonged debates over
the first principles of tort and contract law remain the subjects
of common law adjudication precisely because the stakes are
too small to provoke efforts to achieve legislative reversal of
the common law outcomes. 3 To focus on appellate litigation
is to choose an inaccurate measure of social importance. The
introduction of a system of recording for land transfers or
chattel mortgages may have great institutional significance
even though the operation of such a system will rarely be
litigated in the courts. Similarly, although a decision to require
proximate causation as part of a plaintiffs tort case may not
be the subject of repeated appellate review, such a decision
has far greater importance than the choice between the foresight and directness tests of causation - two tests that are the
subject of much litigation and scholarly dispute, but that yield
the same results in the overwhelming number of cases.
In advancing this thesis, I am not contending that judges
- who may well overestimate the importance of their own
deliberations - do not seek social ends. Nor do I doubt that
influential litigants try to shape the law to their own advantage. My argument is that structural features limit what the
manipulation of common law rules can achieve. The more
focused and sustained methods of legislation and regulation
Trespass to Negligence to Absolute Liability, 37 VA. L. REV. 359 (I95I). A recent
explanation of the 19 th century English common law of contract concludes more
cautiously that, while the rules "were no doubt broadly in the interests of the new
commercial and industrial classes," the common law judges were sincere believers in
their "dogmas" of the neutrality of the law and were often moved by considerations
of the equities of an individual case. P. ATIYAH, THE RISE AND FALL OF FREEDOM
OF CONTRACT 389-90 (1979).

3 See, e.g., infra p. 1730.
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are apt to have more dramatic effects than does alteration of
common law rules and thus will attract the primary efforts of
those trying to use the law to promote their own interests.
This view is called into question by Morton Horwitz' assertion that business interests preferred to arrange subsidies
through the common law system because adjudication is less
politically conspicuous than the legislative process. 4 However,
the contention that nineteenth century commercial interests
and legislatures shrank from public debates on subsidy issues
is questionable simply as a matter of historical fact. 5 Even on
theoretical grounds the arguments seem weak. Common law
decisions are public, not covert. And even if it were thought
that judicial rhetoric could conceal a common law subsidy,
commercial interests often have no choice but to do battle in
arenas, whether their recepthe legislative and administrative
6
tion is friendly or hostile.
In order to understand better the dominance of the legislative and administrative systems, consider the institutional
barriers to effective wealth redistribution through the manipulation of common law rules. Control over the judicial process
is divided between courts and litigants; no one group can
dictate the case agenda. In addition, most common law rules
are not cast in class form; there is no easy one-to-one correspondence between a given rule and the advancement of a
particular social class. The ability to work substantial transfers of wealth between social classes is also severely hampered
by the demand for public justification by written opinion that
lies at the heart of the common law process. The protection
that the resulting generality affords is far from absolute, for
the degree of generality can vary widely with context: a rule
that refers to the rights of A and B without qualification has
greater generality than one referring to promisor and promisee,
which in turn is more general than one referring to creditor
4 M. HORWITZ, supra note 2, at ioo-oi.
5 The public financing of infant industries was often the subject of controversy.
See Schwartz, Tort Law and the Economy in Nineteenth-Century America: A Reinterpretation, go YALE L.J. 1717, 1754-55 (198I).
6 The process does not necessarily cease with legislation, for constitutional challenges may still be brought in the courts. These challenges are beyond the scope of

this Article, but it should be briefly noted that they have proven largely ineffective,
especially in land use cases, precisely because of judicial deference to legislative action.

See, e.g., Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255 (198o); Miller v. Schoene, 276 U.S.
272 (1928); Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926). This
deferential attitude is not a judicial brief for industrial development; environmental
protection legislation is analyzed in exactly the same way. See, e.g., Just v. Marinette
County, 56 Wis. 2d 7, 201 N.W:2d 761 (1972). With the constitutional avenues
foreclosed, the legislative and administrative realms dominate.
HeinOnline -- 95 Harv. L. Rev. 1719 1981-1982

1720

HARVARD LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 95:1717

and debtor. The systematic demand for formal generality and
neutrality in the common law may not guarantee that the
proper substantive result will be reached in any individual
case, but it does provide one bulwark against the invidious
application of legal rules. The easiest way to oppress the poor,
or to confiscate from the rich, is by laws directed at the rich
and poor as such; the clandestine use of formally neutral principles is a poor second choice, to be used only when political
or constitutional obstacles block the direct route. The issue is
effectiveness, not motive. The foremost tools of racial and
religious oppression have not been the doctrines of tort or
contract. By the same token, effective aid to the poor depends
on welfare payments or progressive taxation, not the manipulation of general common law rules.
Thus far I have spoken only of the barriers that prevent
common law adjudication from being used in the first instance
as a means to secure wealth redistribution. Equally formidable
obstacles arise as a result of subsequent efforts to defeat the
rules. One way in which disadvantaged parties can undo any
wealth transfer is by altering their private conduct to minimize
the impact of the law. Because judges normally do not have
at their disposal an arsenal of administrative remedies, the
possibilities of evasion will typically be substantial. A second
means to counter the redistributive effect of common law rules
is to seek modification of the legal standard by legislation.
The greater are the stakes, the more likely it is that the distributive gains will be challenged. The original gain must be
discounted by the probable collective response to the common
law decision.
Similar difficulties plague efforts to attribute substantial
allocative effects to particular common law rules. It is often
said that the common law aims to minimize (perhaps within
a constraint of justice) the total costs of accidents, accident
avoidance, and administration of the legal system. 7 But it is
far easier to state this condition than it is to discern a given
rule that satisfies it. It is, for example, rarely easy to identify
the cheapest cost-avoider or to trace the incentive effects of a
given rule. The effort to make the defendant bear the social
costs of his own activity will complicate efforts to regulate the
plaintiffs conduct. And whatever trade-off is made on the
question of incentives will be in systematic tension with the
demand to economize on administrative costs, which rise with
the sophistication and complexity of the common law liability
7 See, e.g., G. CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS 24-33 (1970).
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rule.8 Without a precise way to measure both the size and the
direction of the countervailing costs and benefits, one cannot
determine with confidence which rule is preferable, let alone
show that the rule finally chosen substantially influences efficiency.
The allocative effects of choices between common law rules
are, in any event, often small in comparison to what is accomplished by direct government action. Statutory controls can
utilize a range of sanctions that are unavailable at common
law: taxes, fines, inspections, filing requirements, and specific
bans and orders with wide and dramatic effects. Even so
simple a matter as placing limitation periods on private actions
requires a statute; no common law principle explains why a
cause of action valid on one day should be barred the next.
Private law remedies are a limited arsenal in comparison; 9 the
private law of nuisance and the Clean Air Act are very different modes of social control.
Having thus raised doubts about the assumptions underlying the claims of both schools, how can we measure the
social consequences of various common law rules? Enough
has been said to show that doctrinal complexity is a poor
surrogate for social significance. In principle, the best possible
approach is to make some direct estimate of the size of the
stakes involved in a choice between rules; unfortunately, this
frontal assault requires data that are not available. We can
develop simpler tests, however, that may yield useful first
approximations.
One such test is whether a legal rule places large numbers
of cases within or without the common law system. Often
these rules involve issues akin to standing or immunity - such
as whether indirect purchasers may sue for injuries sustained
from defective products, or whether hospitals are entitled to
charitable immunities. These "gatekeeper" rules are presumptively of enormous importance even if their status is but infrequently litigated. Unlike general tort liability standards, these
rules gain their effect because they can be directed to specific
social classes or groups.
A second measure of the importance of a given decision
lies in the willingness of those disadvantaged by the rule to
expend resources to persuade a legislature or administrative
agency to change it. The lobbying and coalition formation
essential to secure legislative or regulatory intervention usually

8 See infra p. 1742.
9 See, e.g., infra pp. 1741-42.
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require a major effort, often in the face of determined opposition from those who benefit from the common law status
quo. Of course, the absence of such an effort does not necessarily establish the insignificance of a choice of rules, for
those who are disadvantaged may lack the economic or political resources to make themselves heard. But when there is
such an effort to undo common law outcomes, we can have
some confidence that the stakes in question are commensurate
with the expense incurred.
A third measure of the power of a rule is the extent to
which it cuts off private avenues of escape by the parties
whom it regulates. Retroactive rules have just this characteristic, and thus should be examined with the expectation that
they have substantial social effect. As noted above, it is usually possible to mitigate losses when faced with a known rule
of future application. This possibility is foreclosed when a
new rule is applied to completed transactions. The creditor
who is told that he cannot make a certain class of loans may
lament the loss of the profits he could have expected from such
loans. But the creditor who is told that he cannot reclaim
interest and principal on those same loans when already made
is subject to much greater financial loss.
A rule is therefore more likely to work substantial wealth
transfers - perhaps, but not necessarily, across social classes
- when it has retroactive effect. The direct effect of a retroactive rule on resource allocation is likely to be smaller,
because efficiency incentives operate primarily with respect to
future transactions. Yet systematic efficiency consequences
might result if actors were reluctant to rely on established rules
in similar circumstances for fear of retroactive invalidation.
The distinction between retroactive and prospective legal
changes does not have absolute force. Even when a rule is
wholly prospective in application, its sweep can be so broad
that it has dramatic consequences even after efforts to mitigate
are taken into account. Rules that require parties to abandon
or restructure their standard methods of doing business may
have substantial social consequences.' 0 The bank that is
barred from lending at more than five-percent interest has lost
a great deal, even if it is entitled to collect both interest and
principal on loans already made.
10The use of market outcomes - real or hypothetical - as the baseline against
which to measure the quantitative effect of a rule has only descriptive, and not
normative, force. In each situation, it is an entirely separate and open question
whether the result achieved by the rule is more expedient or more just than the
contractual baseline.
HeinOnline -- 95 Harv. L. Rev. 1722 1981-1982
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To assess the validity of the incautious claims made about
the allocative and distributional effects of certain common law
doctrines, Parts II and III of this Article examine several
doctrinal disputes with an eye not to their proper substantive
outcomes, but to their social importance. My treatment is
necessarily very selective. But the rules chosen for examination have been the focus of extensive judicial and academic
debate, and the analysis applied to them can readily be extended to other areas.
In the law of torts, the persistent tension between negligence and strict liability - a distinction on which great consequences are said to depend - is in my view a matter of
limited social effect. The extended academic discussions of the
differences between the two standards have not given serious
consideration to whether the choice between them is worth the
attention lavished on it. "' Statutory measures such as workers'
compensation systems and direct land use controls through
zoning have far more telling social consequences, while common law rules directed toward specific groups - employers,
manufacturers, or physicians - fall uneasily and unevenly
between the two extremes.
In the law of contract, the great colloquy over consideration
and allied doctrines primarily concerns the internal logic of the
legal system. In contrast to consideration doctrine, the narrowly focused retroactive invalidation of the standard due-onsale clause 12 has quite dramatic consequences, and the advent
of employment discrimination and antitrust laws has wrought
massive changes in labor and commercial relations.
II.

TORT: NEGLIGENCE AND STRICT LIABILITY

It has often been said that the crucial choice for the tort
system is that between the rules of negligence and strict liability in cases of accidental harm.13 The most cursory examination of the numerous cases and scholarly articles on this
issue attests to its central position in the elaboration of tort
doctrine and in the litigation of disputed cases. 14 Once stated,
11See sources cited supra note i & infra note

14.
12 See infra p. 1750.
13 1 have said it myself. C. GREGORY, H. KALVEN & R. EPSTEIN, CASES AND
MATERIALS ON TORTS 47 (3d ed. 1977).

14 The classic treatment is still O.W. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAw ch. 1mI (I881).
For a more contemporary discussion, see Epstein, A Theory of Strict Liability, 2 J.
LEGAL STUD. 151 (1973); Fletcher, Fairness and Utility in Tort Theory, 85 HARv. L.
REV. 537 (1972); Posner, A Theory of Negligence, i J. LEGAL STUD. 29 (1972);

Schwartz, The Vitality of Negligence and the Ethics of Strict Liability, 15 GA. L.
REv. 963 (ig8i).
HeinOnline -- 95 Harv. L. Rev. 1723 1981-1982

1724

HARVARD LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 95:1717

the chosen rule shapes the preparation, settlement, and trial
of cases that come within its capacious boundaries. The
professional roles of lawyers and judges require mastery of the
legal rules and the ways in which they can be extended, distinguished, and applied. It is to precisely this endeavor that
most traditional legal scholarship is quite properly directed.
Yet more has been claimed for this basic choice of the tort
system. The negligence rule - which has dominated the scene
for the past ioo to 125 years - has been credited on one hand
with subsidizing industrial development and on the other with
maximizing the efficient use of scarce resources. The first of
these assertions - especially in the work of Lawrence Friedman and Morton Horwitz - has been associated with a pro-5
gressive, not to say radical, critique of the common law.'
The second, especially in the work of my colleague Richard
16
Posner, has been associated with its conservative defense.
My purpose here is not to take sides in this debate, but to
show that both sides share the error of attributing to the issue
greater significance than it warrants. In dealing with this
question, it is not necessary to make any final assessment of
the relative redistributive or allocative effects of the negligence
and strict liability rules. Indeed, it is quite consistent with the
central thesis of this Article to conclude that the common
elements of the two rules dominate whatever doctrinal differences exist between them and that any major shifts in wealth
or utility attributable to legal rules are apt to result from direct
forms of social control, such as statutes and regulations, rather
than from the evolution of the common law.
A. DistributionalConsequences
The claim that the common law of negligence provided a
"subsidy" for industrial development rests upon two separate
premises. The first is that a rule of strict liability - the
conceptual rival of negligence - constitutes the neutral baseline against which the subsidy is measured. The second is that
the negligence rule effected a truly substantial redistribution
Is See L. FRIEDMAN, supra note 2, at 409-11; M. HORWITZ, supra note 2, at 99ioi. The decisive in-depth historical critique of the Horwitz and Friedman thesis is
Schwartz, supra note 5. His article, which rests on a comprehensive review of i9th
century California and New Hampshire tort cases, id. at 1719 & n.14, goes far to
make up for the lack of any exhaustive nationwide survey, see id. at 1719 n.II, 1774
n.412; see also Scheiber, Regulation, PropertyRights, and Definition of "The Market":
Law and the American Economy, 41 J. ECON. HIST. 103, 107-o8 (i981) (calling for

study of more states).
16 See R. POSNER, supra note i, § 6.11, at 137-42; Landes & Posner, supra note
i, at 873-8o; Posner, supra note 14.
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of wealth into industrial channels. For those who think that
a negligence system provides the neutral baseline in tort
cases, 17 the question of subsidy cannot arise, no matter how
important the distributional consequences of the negligence
rule.' s For those like me 19 and, I believe, Horwitz, 2 0 who
think that the strict liability rule is proper in actions between
strangers, a practical demonstration of the subsidy requires
only a showing of both substantial and systematic differences
in case outcomes. There is, however, reason to doubt that the
effects of any general tort rule are either substantial or systematic.
i. Proportion of Cases Affected. -

In both property dam-

age and personal injury actions, the doctrinal differences between negligence and strict liability are likely to alter the
outcomes only of marginal cases. Under either standard, the
plaintiff must establish causation in fact and offer a calculation
of damages. The difference between the two regimes therefore
goes to the single and doctrinally important issue whether the
defendant breached a duty to exercise "reasonable" care. But
in practice, if negligence were held legally necessary, it could
usually be proved; as a brute fact of nature, most accidents
occur because someone has failed to take the elementary precautions needed to prevent them. What gaps remain between
the two rules can be and have been bridged by res ipsa loquitur 2' and other evidentiary presumptions.
17 See, e.g., 8 W. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 446-47 (2d ed.
1937); O.W. HOLMES, supra note 14, at 92-93; Ames, Law and Morals, 22 HARV. L.
REV. 97, 99 (i9o8).
18 Given that one must choose some rule for every case, a neutral baseline is
necessary if one is not to say trivially that any distributional consequences of the
choice constitute a "subsidy" by definition. Without a baseline, a strict liability rule
necessarily confers a subsidy, so defined, upon those who are disadvantaged by a
negligence system, and vice versa. Recognizing the existence of a baseline gives the
concept of subsidy both moral force and analytic power. Moreover, Horwitz should
be eager to accept this step, for one can more easily condemn a subsidy that works
against the poor if it is in principle possible to avoid conferring any subsidies at all.
19 Epstein, supra note 14, at i89.
20 See M. HoRwITz, supra note 2, at 89 (characterizing 19th century developments
as "habits of thought which would undermine the basic presumption of compensation
for injury that had been erected over several centuries of the common law"); id. at
Io8 ("[These new doctrines . . . underlined a deep tendency in the application of
even conventional doctrine in favor of the active and powerful elements in American
society.").
21 Byrne v. Boadle, 2 Hurl. & C. 722 (Ex. 1863), which first announced the
doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, was decided shortly after the negligence standard had
gained widespread currency in the cases. For the use of various presumptions similar
to res ipsa loquitur, see, for example, Treadwell v. Whittier, So Cal. 574, 582-83, 22
P. 266, 268-69 (1889) (unexplained fall of elevator); Emery v. Boston & Me. R.R.,
67 N.H. 434, 435, 36 A. 367, 367 (1893) (personal injury presumed caused by sudden
HeinOnline -- 95 Harv. L. Rev. 1725 1981-1982
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In addition to this convergence of the two rules, other
considerations cast doubt on the significance of the choice of
liability standards. At least in property damage cases, the
economic importance of the choice is further reduced by the
apparent infrequency of substantial damage claims. Major
private nuisance or blasting cases must be rather uncommon
events for any given tract of land, even in a dense urban
environment. One useful way to test the importance of liability rules is to ask whether they become embedded in the price
of land. The utter indifference of assessors and purchasers to
general liability rules confirms that the choice has almost no
22
effect.
It is therefore difficult to find between the rules the large
variation in outcomes, either for individual cases or in the
aggregate, that constitutes a minimum condition for the redistributive thesis. Any definitive statement about the economic
significance of these liability rules would require more detailed
knowledge than is currently available of the number of suits
filed, the amounts in controversy, and the settlements and
dispositions under each system. Nonetheless, the convergence
of negligence and strict liability suggests that the choice of one
general rule of liability over the other will not result in major
transfers of wealth.
2. Class-Directed Benefits. Whatever wealth transfers
do occur provide evidence for the redistributive thesis only if
they systematically favor one class over another. It is one
thing, for example, to demonstrate that a rule alters the balance between insurance companies and their commercial injerk of train). The New Hampshire courts also applied a presumption to rule out
effectively the contributory negligence defense in railroad crossing cases; plaintiffs won
all 14 of such cases brought in the state during the 19th century. Schwartz, supra
note 5, at 1745. The strength of res ipsa loquitur is, if anything, more powerful in

the property area; the passive role of the plaintiff makes it easier to establish that the
negligence in question was that of the defendant by ruling out (as with the innocent
passerby in Byrne v. Boadle) the possibility of the plaintiff's negligence. See, e.g.,
Hull v. Sacramento Valley R.R., I4 Cal. 387 (1859) (railway spark case).

This is not to deny, of course, that res ipsa loquitur can be stretched beyond its
usual role in the negligence regime to override exhaustive proof of care on the part
of the defendant and achieve a strict liability result in some marginal cases. See, e.g.,
Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 24 Cal. 2d 453, 461, 150 P.2d 436, 440 (I944) (en
banc).
22 Assessors' guides, for example, never mention tort liability rules. See, e.g., D.
SHEEHAN & J. CODURI, RHODE ISLAND ASSESSORS' HANDBOOK 6.ri-.I2 (1975) (in
section entitled "Special Factors Affecting Land Values," subsection entitled "Legal
Factors" lists "planning and zoning, deed restrictions, easements and taxation," but
does not refer to tort liability); see also Franzen, Valuation of Land, in PROCEEDINGS
OF SHORT COURSE FOR ILLINOIS ASSESSING OFFICIALS I8 (A. Sokolow ed. 1957)
(zoning "affects the value of residential areas"; tort liability not mentioned).
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sureds; it is quite another to show that a rule favors the rich
at the expense of the poor. In considering this question, one
must distinguish real-property damage cases from personal injury actions. In property damage cases, there is little reason
to believe a priori that different economic classes will be
arrayed against one another or that any one class will have a
consistent interest in choosing one liability standard over another. In principle, there is a greater possibility of redistribution in personal injury cases, although - as I argue below
there are several reasons to doubt that such transfers have
occurred.
(a) Property Damage. (i) The Calculus of Potential
Gains. - The very sweep of the intellectual debate over negligence and strict liability cuts against the redistributive thesis
in real-property damage cases. It is very difficult for anyone
to turn a general liability rule to his private ends. 23 Even if
the choice between negligence and strict liability regimes would
make a difference, which rule should a rational firm choose?
An individual firm engaged in one lawsuit, and thus immediately faced with a choice of rules, does not know what its
posture will be in future actions. It must therefore perform
the nearly impossible task of discounting the expected value
of each (unknown) future suit to decide which rule best suits
its interest. If it opts for the negligence rule in the expectation
that it will usually be a defendant, it runs the risk of compromising any actions it may later bring for damage to its plant.
If it chooses strict liability, its own future construction and
operating costs will be increased by the added risks of suit.
This dilemma raises important problems for the redistributive thesis. If a firm lacks meaningful statistical data on how
often it will be a plaintiff and how often a defendant, it cannot
determine which liability rule works in its favor, and hence is
unable to press for a subsidy even if one were theoretically
possible. And even if a firm is prepared to expend the resources to acquire accurate data, the potential for redistribution is quite narrowly confined. Thus, if a firm does not find
itself in one role more frequently than in the other, a significant
subsidy cannot be achieved by manipulating general tort liability rules. A firm can hope to exploit the benefits of any
general liability rule only if it is frequently engaged in litigation
and can expect generally to assume the same adversarial role.
If one looks beyond the decision process of a single firm,
the calculation becomes far more complex and the likelihood
of achieving gains correspondingly decreases. Because the
23

See supra pp. 1719-20.
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land holdings and plans of firms will differ, interests will
inevitably clash and firms will have different experiences with
respect to their frequency of alignment as plaintiff or defendant. There are no effective means by which businesses could
cooperate to define a common agenda in property damage
cases.
These barriers to the redistributive thesis are further
strengthened by the fact that many, if not most, property damage suits are likely to set one firm against another, so that any
wealth transfer that does occur will be confined within a single
class. Industries tend to concentrate in certain regions, if only
because of the enormous advantages of being close to customers, suppliers, and even competitors. It may have been coincidental that the plaintiff in Rylands v. Fletcher24 was a miner
like the defendant, but there was never any reason to assume
that most plaintiffs in the flooding cases would be farmers.
All the parties in the two flooding cases 25 that preceded Rylands v. Fletcher were miners. Because businesses are concentrated in industrial zones or on land suited to the intended
enterprise, property damage actions will commonly be fought
by parties in some, if not the same, business: flooding cases
arose between miners, just as cattle
trespass cases arose be26
tween neighboring cattle owners.
Finally, the difficulties of attaining subsidies through common law rules are further complicated by the "public good"
problem. 2 7 Let it be supposed that a general rule, whatever
its content, provides benefits to a large number of parties who
are not before the court. Yet a single firm must bear all the
costs of developing the rule in the individual case. What
reason is there to expect that any firm will shoulder all the
costs when it captures only a tiny fraction of the benefit? If
the stakes of an individual case are substantial, the firm's safer
and more cost-effective route typically is to concentrate on the
facts rather than seeking to persuade the court to champion a
novel or controversial doctrine.

24 3 L.R.-E. & I. App. 330 (H.L. i868).
25 Baird v. Williamson, 143 Eng. Rep. 831 (C.P. 1863); Smith v. Kendrick, 137
Eng. Rep. 205 (C.P. r849).

26 When it was proposed in England in I953 to convert cattle trespass into a tort
of negligence, at least for personal injuries and damage to animals, the proposal was
rejected because of the opposition of farmers themselves. Report of the Committee
on the Law of Civil Liability for Damage Done by Animals, Cmnd. 8746, at 4, para.
3 (1953) ("This class of liability is of interest only to farmers and landowners[,] and
the general public are not affected thereby.").
27For the classic statement of the theme, see M. OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION ch. I (1965).
HeinOnline -- 95 Harv. L. Rev. 1728 1981-1982
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To avoid all of these difficulties, commentators sometimes
say that judges can be counted on to turn the common law to
the task of subsidizing industrial development. Even if judges
were so inclined, however, they would have to overcome the
same problem that stymies individual firms: how to know
which rule will advance the aggregate interests of the class
they wish to help.
Moreover, there is little historical evidence of a consistent
judicial bias in favor of industry. In both strict liability and
negligence cases, courts showed a marked hostility to the idea
that even statutorily authorized activities, such as railroads
and canals, could be immunized from damage actions. 28 And
disputes over the more general choice of liability rule reveal
that the judiciary has never been of a single mind on the
proper foundations of tort liability, possibly because of disagreement on more fundamental issues of social policy. Nineteenth century opinions are notable primarily for their marked
29
divergence on the issue of negligence versus strict liability.
Indeed, the dominant view was that nuisance cases were controlled by strict liability principles, which the redistribution
theorists regard to be contrary to industrial interests. There
was certainly language in the cases that spoke in terms of the
"reasonableness" of a defendant's conduct; yet while this formula sometimes referred to the want of negligence, it often
-

one can probably say most often -

referred only to some

minimum level of harm necessary to sustain the basic cause of
action. 30 The dominant view also inclined toward strict lia28 See, e.g., Hookset v. Amoskeag Mfg. Co., 44 N.H. 1O5, 107, io

(1862) (strict

liability); Booth v. Rome, W. & 0. Terminal R.R., 14o N.Y. 267, 272 (1893) (negligence). Contra M. HoRwrTz, supra note 2, at 79-8o. This hostility is also clearly
implicit in Lexington & Ohio Ry. v. Applegate, 38 Ky. (8 Dana) 289, 299-300 (1839)

(legislature may not authorize takings for private purposes), on which Horwitz relies.
See infra pp. 1730-31, 1733. What is obtained is protection against criminal prosecutions, and perhaps against injunctive relief in advance of a showing of particular
harm. See Applegate, 38 Ky. (8 Dana) at 298, 300. The English courts similarly
refused to imply statutory immunities. See, e.g., Powell v. Fall, 5 Q.B.D. 597 (188o)
(allowing strict liability actions in tort against railroads that had complied with all
statutory requirements; disapproving Vaughan v. Taff Vale Ry. Co., 157 Eng. Rep.
1351 (Ex. Ch. i86o) (requiring proof of negligence in same situation)).

29 See Schwartz, supra note 5, at 1737-53, 1758-59. The extreme differences
among the social theories apparent in the various speeches delivered by the judges
who decided Rylands v. Fletcherare exceeded only by the differences in interpretation
subsequently put on those divisions by commentators. Compare Bohlen, The Rule in
Rylands v. Fletcher, 59 U. PA. L. REV. 298, 373, 423 (1911) (arguing that block of
upper-class judges swung the decision), with Molloy, Fletcher v. Rylands: A Reexamination of Juristic Origins, 9 U. CHI. L. REv. 266 (1942) (investigation of backgrounds of judges revealed no class-related groupings in the panel).
30 See F. HARPER & F. JAMES, THE LAW OF TORTS § 1.24 (1956); W. PROSSER,
HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 89, at 596--6o

(4 th ed. 1971).
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bility in the blasting cases, except in the famous, but highly
erratic, line of New York explosion cases. During the nineteenth century, the New York courts veered uneasily between
strict liability and negligence and only conclusively resolved
the issue (if indeed it has been resolved) in favor of strict
liability in i969. 3 1 Had the issue been of anything more than
marginal social importance, no society could have tolerated
the glacial pace at which the New York courts worked out,
over the course of 120 years, the liability rules for explosions.
And if the issue had been the source of class conflict, it is even
more implausible to suppose that this judicial indecisiveness
could have escaped legislative examination.
(ii) Institutional Competence. - In addition to the primarily economic objections developed above, the structural
limitations of the common law system weaken the subsidy
thesis by providing an alternative - and cogent - explanation
for judicial behavior, especially in the land use cases. The
courts have recognized for centuries that only legislative bodies
possess the means to devise effective and comprehensive solutions to many of the most serious issues in the field of land
use; in most instances, the judiciary has accordingly refrained
from attempts to regulate matters that require systematic treatment. Although the subsidy thesis consistently overlooks this
point, it can be illustrated by two of the very cases relied on
by Horwitz as evidence for his argument.
In Lexington & Ohio Railroad v. Applegate, 3 2 the plaintiffs
sought to enjoin the operation of a railroad that ran through
the center of Louisville. Horwitz quotes in isolation the passage from the opinion that speaks of the importance of railroads for economic growth; 33 if read alone, the excerpt might
be taken to indicate that the courts strove to subsidize various
forms of industrial development. But the passage itself is
obiter dicta, as four separate reasons taken together led the
31 See Hay v. Cohoes Co., 2 N.Y. 159 (1849) (strict liability for blasting); Losee
v. Buchanan, 51 N.Y. 476 (1873) (distinguishing Rylands v. Fletcher and adopting
a negligence standard to govern a boiler explosion); Heeg v. Licht, 8o N.Y. 579 (188o)
(strict liability for detonation of prudently stored explosives); Booth v. Rome, W. &
0. Terminal R.R., 14o N.Y. 267, 279, 35 N.E. 592, 596 (1893) (negligence rule
adopted in blasting case that was distinguished from Hay by lack of physical invasion
and smaller quantity of explosives involved, but court recognized "how narrow the
margin is which separates this from some decided cases"); Spano v. Perini Corp., 25
N.Y.2d ii, 17, 250 N.E.2d 31, 34, 302 N.Y.S.2d 527, 531 (1969) (stating that the
Booth "rationale cannot withstand analysis" and adopting a strict liability rule). The
twists are chronicled in Kalven, Tort Law: Tort Watch, 34 J. AM. TRIAL LAW. ASS'N
I, 29-44 (1972).
32 38 Ky. (8 Dana) 289 (1839).
33 M. HoRwITz, supra note 2, at 74-75.
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court to deny the injunction. The first reason, immediately
relevant here, was that the legislature had authorized the operation of the route and thus that the grant of an injunction
would not simply have been a decision on the merits, but a
3 4 Judirect challenge to a coordinate branch of government.
dicial deference to legislative action, one of the most powerful
institutional constraints on a court, therefore explains the case
35
better than does any desire to subsidize industrial growth.
The decision in Applegate should be understood to embody a
sensible division of responsibility, similar to the balance that
obtains today, between the courts and the legislature in land
use matters. Damage actions remain available for actual nuisances, and injunctions may be obtained to prevent imminent
or ongoing harm. But the relative stakes should not be forgotten. A single legislative decision to permit development is
in the end far more important than frequent litigation on the
permissible scope of industrial operations.
The ancient distinction between public and private nuisances both demonstrates and explains the historical persistence of this distribution of powers between coordinate
branches of government. The early common law recognized
that pervasive nuisances could be abated, if at all, solely by
legislative or administrative action, including criminal prosecutions. 3 6 The courts, however, gave individuals a right of
action to abate a public nuisance when they had suffered
"some extraordinary damage" from the general wrong. 37 Hor-

witz claims to detect in the nineteenth century cases a judicial
determination to apply the previously "narrow and technical
public nuisance doctrine," which had not operated to bar the
actions of plaintiffs with special injuries, in an expansive manner that effectively abrogated the private nuisance action.
Again he finds in this sudden doctrinal shift an effort to remove
38
the legal fetters from economic growth.
34 38 Ky. (8 Dana) at 298, 300.

3s The second consideration that quite properly swayed the court was that many
citizens of Louisville had testified on both sides of the case. Id. at 291-93, 308. The
divergence in local opinion illustrates again that private interests will be far from
univocal in most land use cases. Third, the court went to great lengths to note that
any action to enjoin the railroad was "premature," given that its operation had not
yet resulted in any harm to abutting landowners or other users of the right-of-way.
Id. at 300. For discussion of the fourth ground of decision, uncertainty over the
consequences of an injunction, see infra p. 1733.
36 Anon., Y.B. Mich. 27 Hen. 8, f. 27, pl. 10 (1535), translatedin C.H.S. FIFOOT,
HIsToRY AND SOURCES OF THE COMMON LAW 98 (1949).
37 3 V. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *219.

38 See M. HoRwITZ, supra note 2, at 76-78.
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In support of this proposition, Horwitz 39 relies upon Smith
v. City of Boston.40 The plaintiff, who owned lands abutting
a private street, was forced to take a more circuitous route to
his properties when a portion of the street was closed, pursuant
to a local charter, to make way for a railroad track. Chief
Justice Shaw, speaking for the court, rejected the plaintiff's
claim for damages. Horwitz's key criticism of the case is that
Shaw distorted the traditional threshold test for maintaining
a private nuisance action by shifting the inquiry from the
degree of harm suffered to its kind. The court thereby, contends Horwitz, dismissed the suit of a landowner who had
suffered the type of disproportionate injury that had previously
furnished the basis for a private claim. This criticism again
ignores the institutional context of the court's decision:
Upon the question of public convenience, it is the province of
the mayor and the aldermen, upon a balance of all considerations bearing upon it, to decide. It is not to be presumed
that they will discontinue a highway once laid out unless the
considerations in favor of the discontinuance decidedly pre41
ponderate.
Moreover, Horwitz overdraws the novelty of the distinction
between degree and kind; he fails to note that Shaw continued
to recognize exactly the class of harm to property rights traditionally given individual redress - complete loss of access
- but denied relief because the plaintiffs land was still accessible by other streets. 42 Smith thus adhered to the precise
line set out as early as 1535. The involvement of railroad
interests in the case had nothing to do with the outcome; if
the street had been converted to a playground, the same set
of legal principles would have applied. The issue was not the
promotion of growth, but the distribution of governmental
power.
The institutional demarcation recognized in Applegate and
Smith requires some fixed and definite line to separate legislative and judicial functions. Personal injuries and complete
loss of access provide that line; relative changes in property
values blur it beyond recognition. The courts can hardly entertain large numbers of individual actions every time a street
is closed. In a similar vein, the judges who decided Applegate
were aware that courts are incapable of controlling overall
levels of pollution; they lack the investigative resources to
39 Id. at 77-78.
40 61 Mass. (7 Cush.) 254 (185i).

41 Id. at 256.
42 Id. at 255-56.
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canvass the alternative measures that might be adopted, the
financial resources to implement preferred alternatives, and
the plenary coercive power to ensure that the solution is adhered to by the whole class of responsible parties. Indeed,
enjoining operation of the railroad in an attempt to reduce air
and noise pollution might, under the circumstances, have been
counterproductive; as the court noted, the elimination of the
railroad would have encouraged the use of substitute modes
of transportation that might have been more "pestilent" than
43
the railroad.
The institutional argument about public nuisances extends
across all major public choices that ban or restrict certain
forms of development. In the context of modern zoning, the
critical decision is not whether the operation of a particular
factory or apartment house happens on the facts of the case
to constitute a nuisance. It is whether the structure may be
built at all. Damage suits for nuisance under a negligence
standard levy a small, random tax on land use; speaking
crudely, the substitution of a strict liability standard merely
raises the tax by a small amount. A flat prohibition by zoning,
on the other hand, removes the entire expected profit from the
preferred use of a parcel of land and may easily reduce the
property's value by eighty percent overnight, as did the ordi44
nance involved in Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co.,
the fons et origo of modern zoning law.
These shifts in value are well understood by the public at
large; zoning board meetings are well attended precisely because such boards can and do act selectively, creating and
destroying stores of wealth. 45 In fact, the whole field of zoning
43 Applegate, 38 Ky. (8 Dana) at 309. Far higher levels of environmental harm
had to be tolerated in the 19 th century, inasmuch as the direct and opportunity costs

of controlling such harm were much higher in the relatively primitive state of contemporary technology. See Brenner, Nuisance Law and the Industrial Revolution, 3 J.
LEGAL STUD. 403 (1974) (noting high levels of pollution tolerated in 19th century
English nuisance law). See generally Epstein, Nuisance Law: CorrectiveJustice and
Its UtilitarianConstraints,8 J. LEGAL STUD. 49, 101-02 (979) (discussing inadequacy

of 20th century tort remedies as means of controlling pollution); Juergensmeyer,
Control of Air Pollution Through the Assertion of Private Rights, 1967 DUKE L.J.
1126, 130-37 (discussing inadequacies of modern nuisance law for controlling pollution); Michelman, Pollution as a Tort: A Non-Accidental Perspective on Calabresi's
Costs (Book Review), 8o YALE L.J. 647, 667-86 (x971) (arguing that cost internali-

zation is not an effective method of combating air pollution).
44 272 U.S. 365 (1926).

45 The selection may be at the level of subcategories of rights, see, e.g., Newport
Assocs. v. Solow, 30 N.Y.2d 263, 283 N.E.2d 600, 332 N.Y.S.2d 617 (1972) (zoning
ordinance creates air rights), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 931 (1973), or at the level of

individual properties, see, e.g., Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S.
104, 138 (1978) (upholding historical-preservation zoning).
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is marked by intensive efforts to influence decisions, to mount
constitutional challenges to government action, to advance and
beat back legislative proposals. 4 6 Think of the consequences
of transparent devices such as large-lot zoning directed against
lower income classes. 4 7 Such matters are the natural focus of
interest group politics. What railroad, what manufacturer
would expend resources lobbying on the structure of common
law rules of negligence or strict liability when much more
urgent issues and more powerful measures are at hand? We
should expect attention to be directed to questions such as
whether rights-of-way can be acquired, whether competitors
can be excluded, and whether high rates can be propped up
by state-supported controls. 48 And as a rule, such issues are
addressed by statute or regulation rather than through common
law adjudication.
(b) PersonalInjuries. - In principle, personal injury cases
offer a greater opportunity for systematic redistribution than
do property damage suits. In most personal injury actions,
when a firm is involved, it is as the defendant against an
individual plaintiff; thus, many of the information costs and
countervailing interests that operated to undermine the redistributive thesis in the property area4 9 are not problems in the
46 See, e.g., William C. Haas & Co. v. City of San Francisco, 605 F.2d 1117 (9th
Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 928 (198o).
47 Compare Southern Burlington County NAACP v. Township of Mount Laurel,
67 N.J. 151, 336 A.2d 713 (developing municipality may not zone so as to exclude
low-income and moderate-income people), appeal dismissed and cert. denied, 423 U.S.
808 (1975), with Pascack Ass'n v. Mayor of Washington, 74 N.J. 470, 379 A.2d 6
(1977) (holding Mt. Laurel doctrine inapplicable to established communities). For
trenchant criticism, see Sager, InsularMajorities Unabated: Warth v. Seldin and City
of Eastlake v. Forest City Enterprises, Inc., 91 HARV. L. REV. 1373, 1418-23 (1978)
(zoning may contribute to "deplorable" segregation along economic and racial lines,
inconsistent with tenets of reasonableness and fairness).
48 The special grants to the Northern Pacific Railroad of alternate blocks of land
for the entire length of the road from Lake Superior to Puget Sound and Portland,
Oregon were authorized in the Act of July 2, x864, ch. 217, 13 Stat. 365, as modified
and supplemented by the joint resolution of May 31, 1870, 16 Stat. 378. The Supreme
Court held that the original statute was converted into a contract by acceptance and
completion of the work, United States v. Northern Pac. Ry., 256 U.S. 51, 64 (1921),
but later held that the Railway, by its failure to perform, forfeited its contractual
right to select certain land, United States v. Northern Pac. Ry., 311 U.S. 317 (1940).
On the creation of the Interstate Commerce Commission as a response to the
inability of railroads to maintain their rate structure in the face of increasing competition, see G. KOLKO, RAILROADS AND REGULATION 1877-1916, chs. 1-6 (1965).
The issues here dwarf those of tort liability for the use of railroad equipment or lands
and must be far more important than the personal injury cases discussed at infra pp.
1735-36. The costs of adjusting insurance or self-insurance to any changes in tort
liability can hardly compare with the effects of the disintegration of a cartel.
49 See supra pp. 1727-28.
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personal injury field. Of course, the convergence of negligence
and strict liability50 makes it probable that any aggregate effect, whether or not redistributive, will not be great. Several
other factors, discussed below, raise additional doubts about
the relative magnitude of the transfers involved.
(i) Injuries to Strangers. - In the nineteenth century, as
in the twentieth, the highway accident cases - in which Hor5 l
witz himself locates the origins of the negligence standard
- typically involved private parties on both sides. Whatever
the precise numbers, any efforts to arrange a subsidy for industrial defendants would have been constrained by the need
to develop a set of rules that would also do adequate service
between private citizens, some of whom would themselves be
well-to-do. The only way to create a powerful subsidy for
industry in a common law setting would have been to develop
a lower standard of care for firms than for private individuals.
Here the analysis of judicial behavior must ultimately rest on
empirical evidence. To the extent that variations in the standard of reasonable care can be detected, Gary Schwartz's masterful and exhaustive study of New Hampshire and California
cases demonstrates that, in fact, very high standards were
often expected of institutions - manufacturers, railroads, and
electric companies, among others - whose expertise was taken
for granted by the courts. 5 2 In addition, it is not clear that
industrialists would have enthusiastically supported such a
double standard; no corporate executive could be certain that
he would not himself be injured by another firm's defective
elevator or brakeless streetcar. Would he have been willing
to give up his own right to sue for the resulting loss of his
earning power?
Other doctrinal choices support this same view. The redistributive thesis should predict an aggressive expansion of
the contributory negligence defense. Of perhaps even greater
importance, the thesis should also predict a refusal to adopt
strict liability principles in vicarious liability cases, in order to
help to insulate the corporation from suits by strangers, for a
stringent strict liability standard would let many suits through
the gate. Yet these predictions also fail empirically; in neither
of these areas do we see a steady, confident progression of the
cases to a single end. The nineteenth century judiciary viewed
contributory negligence with some ambivalence5 3 and applied
50 See supra p. 1725 & note 21.
51 M. HoRWrrz, supra note 2, at 88.
52 See Schwartz, supra note 5, at 1744, 1749-52, 1757-59.
53 See id. at 1759-63 (describing New Hampshire and California cases).
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vicarious liability expansively,5 4 notwithstanding the theoretical doubts that many contemporary legal writers entertained
about a principle that could hold A responsible for the act of
B without any personal wrongdoing on A's part. 55 Indeed, the
nineteenth century doctrinal disputes over the basis of tort
liability had a very similar flavor to those that had taken place
centuries before in England, 5 6 or indeed to those recorded in
the standard Roman law texts.5 7 The uncertain course of
judicial decisions over the generations accurately reflects both
the difficulty of the subject matter and its marginal economic

impact.
(ii) Industrial Accidents. - At first blush, the redistributive thesis does find support in the field of industrial accidents.
But the reason that common law doctrines mattered in this
setting is that they were narrowly drawn and functioned as
"gatekeeper" rules. In the extensive nineteenth century discussions of employers' liability, the choice between negligence
and strict liability was overwhelmed by the enormous disagreement over whether the assumption of risk defense, especially when "implied" from conduct, was sufficient to bar an
58
employee's negligence cause of action.
Employers constitute a (relatively) compact group; both
they and employees know their future roles, and - unlike
54 See, e.g., Limpus v. London Gen. Omnibus Co., i Hurl. & C. 526, 158 Eng.
Rep. 993 (Ex. 1862) (holding that a master remains responsible for the torts of his
servant no matter how emphatically he orders the servant not to engage in the tortious
activity).
55See Holmes, Agency (pts. i & 2), 4 HARv. L. REV. 345 (189I), 5 HARV. L.
REv. I (I89I). As early as 1876, Lord Blackburn justified vicarious liability on the
ground that employers are rich and employees poor. River Weir Comm'rs v. Adamson, 2 App. Cas. 743, 767 (1876). In 1916, Baty attributed the growth of vicarious
liability to the desire to ensure that "damages are taken from a deep pocket." T.

BATY, VICARIOUS LIABILITY 154 (i916).

56 See C.H.S. FIFOOT, supra note 36, ch. 8 (1949) (interpreting the early forms of
action to be negligence-based); Arnold, Accident, Mistake, and Rules of Liability in
the Fourteenth-CenturyLaw of Torts, 128 U. PA. L. REv. 361 (1979) (detailing the
confused early relationship between trespass and case, and generally interpreting both
as forms of strict liability); Winfield, The Myth of Absolute Liability, 42 LAw Q. REv.
37 (1926) (negligence interpretation).
57 See, e.g., F. LAwvsON, NEGLIGENCE IN THE CIVIL LAWV (195o). The Roman
sources discussed by Lawson are largely drawn from the Lex Aquilia, which has
overtones of both negligence and strict liability.
58 The fellow servant rule, announced in England in Priestley v. Fowler, 3 Mees.
& W. i, i5o Eng. Rep. 1030 (Ex. 1837), and then adopted in the United States in
Farwell v. Boston & W.R.R., 45 Mass. (4 Met.) 49 (1842), was the most extreme
form of the assumption of risk doctrine. Even in this form, the extent of redistribution
is unclear, given the possibility that employees received increased wages to offset the
greater risk to which they were subject. The court in Fanvell explicitly relied upon
the possibility of wage adjustments in approving the fellow servant rule. See 45
Mass. (4 Met.) at 57.
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landowners and victims of plummeting elevators - neither
are plagued by conflicting interests. These differences in the
original positions of the interested groups may explain the
considerable legislative efforts in the nineteenth century to
modify common law rules governing liability for industrial
accidents. Some statutes abolished the common employment
60
defense;5 9 others removed the assumption of risk defense;
still others imposed specific statutory duties on employers for
61
the benefit of their workers and of third parties.
But it comes as no surprise that major structural changes
in the treatment of industrial accidents, changes that did not
occur until the early twentieth century, resulted from legislation. The revolution was, of course, the adoption of comprehensive workers' compensation laws, which - because of their
complex administrative provisions and detailed benefit rules
could not have been introduced by judicial decision. Although one must not discount the importance of ideological
causes of the change, the economic stakes involved are indicated by the willingness of all interested groups to bear the
substantial expenses of organizing coalitions, testifying, lob62
bying, and drafting and passing legislation.
59Railway workers were the chief beneficiaries of the movement. See Act of Mar.
5, I856, Pub. L. No. I03, § 3, i855-56 Ga. Laws 155, 155; Act of Apr. 8, 1862, ch.
169, § 7, 1861-62 Iowa Acts 197, 198; Act of Feb. 26, 1874, ch. 93, § i, 187 4 Kan.
Sess. Laws 143, 143. To measure the impact of abolishing the rule, one should in
principle be able to compare both accident and wage rates between jurisdictions that
did and did not abolish the common employment defense during the x9 th century.
A study of this sort would demand that the investigator hold constant all relevant
variables (such as age, composition of workforce) and would be extraordinarily difficult, but only such a study could resolve the issue.
60 See, e.g.,Act of Feb. 23, 1897, ch. 56, 1897 N.C. Priv. Laws 83, construed in
Coley v. North Carolina R.R., 129 N.C. 407, 409-10, 40 S.E. 195, 196-97 (railway
liability act is "unconditional abrogation" of the defense), affg in relevant part after
reh'g 128 N.C. 534, 538-41, 39 S.E. 43, 44-46 (i9oi).
61 See, e.g., Safety Applicance Act of 1893, ch. 196, 27 Stat. 531, amended by Act
of April x, 1896, ch. 87, 29 Stat. 85 (compelling railroads to equip all cars in interstate
commerce with automatic couplers and continuous brakes, and abolishing assumption
of risk defense for cases of employee injury on nonconforming equipment). The
expense of the modifications required was so great that railroads were granted extensive periods of time in which to comply. The great movement to workmen's compensation acts in the early 2oth century, see infra p. 1738 & notes 63-65, was preceded
by a number of I 9 th century employers' liability acts. E.g., Act of May 14, 1887, ch.
270, 1887 Mass. Acts 899; Employers' Liability Act, 1880, 43 & 44 Vict., ch. 42.
62 It can been argued that workers' compensation acts did not have a substantial
redistributive effect; although they made some level of compensation almost automatic
for most work-related accidents, the acts also accommodated employers' interests by
limiting the size of the award for each accident. See Epstein, The HistoricalOrigins
and Economic Structure of Workers" Compensation Laws, I6 GA. L. REv. (forthcoming). However, the acts clearly did have an enormous impact on the treatment of
industrial accident claims.
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The introduction of these laws, first in England 63 and
thereafter in the United States, 64 usually followed extensive
legislative debate - exemplified by the Report of the Wainwright Commission 65 in New York - over the soundness of
the common law rules. But throughout this debate, legislative
attention was never focused on the choice between negligence
and strict liability. That lack of interest was not due to any
failure of legal professionals to raise the issue: workers' compensation was challenged constitutionally - with some initial
success - on the ground that it imposed "liability without
fault,"' 66 and Jeremiah Smith in his famous attack upon the
novel system knew so little of its internal operations that he
wholly mischaracterized it as a return to the strict liability
principles of the year 1400.67 In fact, the new "arising out of
and in the course of employment" formula bore no relationship
to the traditional common law strict liability rules, because it
dispensed with the requirement that liability rest upon specific
acts or omissions of the employer. Self-inflicted harm to employees was fully compensable; only willful misconduct barred
a claim. The legislative solution had discarded the entire tort
liability system in the field of industrial accidents and started
anew.
(iii) Class Definition: Actions and Actors. - Other examples of the far greater distributive impact of carefully targeted
liability rules - whether in the common law or the legislative
realm - are numerous. As noted above, the common employment rule had great importance because it flatly barred
entire classes of claims. The privity rule of Winterbottom v.
Wright68 was understood from its inception to have the same
function and hence the same significance. Lord Abinger, in

63 Workmen's Compensation Act, 1897, 60 & 61 Vict., ch. 37.
64E.g., 191o N.Y. Laws ch. 674.
65 The full title is Report to the Legislature of the State of New York by the
Commission Appointed Under Chapter 518 of the Laws of z9o9 to Inquire into the
Question of Employer's Liability and Other Matters. J. Mayhew Wainwright was the
chairman of the Commission.
66 Ives v. South Buffalo Ry., 2oi N.Y. 271, 309-1I, 94 N.E. 43!, 445-46 (1911)
(holding the New York workmen's compensation law unconstitutional under federal
and state constitutions). The New York Constitution was promptly amended, in
1913, to overrule the state constitutional aspect of Ives, N.Y. CONST. of 1894, art.
I, § i9 (now art. I, § i8), and the state legislature immediately passed a new workmen's compensation scheme, 1913 N.Y. Laws ch. 816, reenacted by 1914 N.Y. Laws
ch. 41. Subsequently, the Supreme Court upheld the new law against federal constitutional challenge. New York Cent. R.R. v. White, 243 U.S. i88 (2917).
67 Smith, Sequel to Workmen's Compensation Acts, 27 HARv. L. REV. 235 (1913).
68 2o Mees. & W. 109, 152 Eng. Rep. 402 (Ex. 1842).
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announcing the rule, noted that it was necessary in order to

prevent the "infinity of actions" that might follow in its absence. 69 And the modern expansion of products liability law

is best understood not in terms of a shift from negligence to
strict liability, but in terms of the far more important shift to
a prohibition of contracting-out of liabilities otherwise demanded by tort law70 and the subsequent imposition of extensive common law duties designed to protect individual plain-

tiffs from the risk of third-party harms or from their own
misconduct. 7 1 In products liability law, as in the law of industrial accidents, the existence of a definable and limited class
of defendants increases the possibility of systematic biases in
the rules. The law of medical malpractice shares the same
characteristic. Yet the true measure of the shifts lies not in
the language of the appellate opinions, but in the well-known
increases in the premiums demanded for both medical malpractice and products liability insurance that mark the onset
of this new legal order.72 Predictably, the dramatic rise in
69 Id. at 113, 152 Eng. Rep. at 404.
70 See Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27
Cal. Rptr. 697 (1963) (en banc) (holding manufacturer liable in personal injury claim
for breach of express and implied warranties); Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc.,
32 N.J. 358, 16i A.2d 69 (i96o) (striking down various contractual limitations on
liability on ground that they had been unfairly obtained). Greenman emphasized that
the strict liability of the manufacturers
is not assumed by agreement but imposed by law, and the refusal to permit
the manufacturer to define the scope of its own responsibility for defective
products make [sic] clear that the liability is not one governed by the law of
contract warranties but by the law of strict liability in tort.
59 Cal. 2d at 63, 377 P.2d at 901, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 701 (citations omitted).
71 See, e.g., Larsen v. General Motors Corp., 391 F.2d 495 (8th Cir. 1968)
(imposing on manufacturer a duty to use reasonable care in designing for crashworthiness, in order to avoid unreasonable risk to user); Stevens v. Parke, Davis & Co.,
9 Cal. 3d 51, 507 P.2d 653, 107 Cal. Rptr. 45 (1973) (en banc) (manufacturer's
"overpromotion" of a product while "watering down" hazards may be evidence in
products liability action); Micallef v. Miehle Co., 39 N.Y.2d 376, 348 N.E.2d 571,
384 N.Y.S.2d 115 (1976) (obviousness of defect not absolute defense). These decisions
do not involve a movement from negligence to strict liability, but the creation of some
new affirmative duty where previously no duty existed - a gatekeeper phenomenon.
Once the imposition of duty is settled, little turns on how it is formulated. For a
fuller statement of the argument that the difference between negligence and strict
liability means relatively little in the design defects cases, see R. EPSTEIN, MODERN
PRODUCTS LIABILITY LAW 76-91 (i98o).
72 None of the cases most celebrated for having established the trend towards
strict liability, from MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 217 N.Y. 382, xIu N.E. 1O5O
(I916), through Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 24 Cal. d 453, 150 P.2d 436
(1944) (en banc), and Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 16i A.2d
69 (196o), to Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc. 59 Cal. 2d 67, 377 P.2d 897, 27
Cal. Rptr. 697 (1963), was followed by any real rise in premiums. Insurance rates
began to take off only around 1975. See INTER-AGENCY TASK FORCE ON PRODUCT
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insurance rates was quickly followed by an intense demand
for legislative reform at both the state73 and the federal 74 level.
B. Efficiency
A recognition of the major difficulties of the subsidy hypothesis clears the way for an examination of its rival social
explanation, the view that the adoption of the negligence system maximizes the wealth of society at large. Many of the
arguments developed in the previous section also apply to the
efficiency thesis. For example, if a shift from negligence to
strict liability - or vice versa - does not have a significant
impact on the outcome of cases, it can hardly be expected to
cause major allocative effects. 75 Rather than simply rehearse
the preceding points in this context, however, the following
section examines briefly the two factors generally thought to
measure the efficiency implications of common law rules: incentive effects and administrative costs.
The law and economics approach lays
i. Incentives. great stress on the incentives for cost-minimizing behavior that
legal rules are said to create. 76 The supposed beauty of the
negligence system is that it requires defendants only to take
cost-justified precautions, because greater precautions produce
LIABILITY, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, FINAL REPORT at VI-iI to -24 (1978). The
deviation from the previous contractual norm made possible by Greenman and Henningsen acquired real force only when it been supplemented with other, more focused
duties laid upon product manufacturers by the courts. See, e.g., cases cited supra
note 71.
73 See, e.g., ARIz. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 12-551, -68i to -686 (1978) (placing limits
on products liablity actions); MODEL UNIFORM PRODUCT LIABILITY ACT (1979),
reprinted in 44 Fed. Reg. 62,714 (I979); Dworkin, Product Liability Reform and the
Model Uniform Product Liability Act, 6o NEB. L. REv. 50 (i981). A much revised
version of the Uniform Act is now under consideration at the federal level. For a
review of recent developments in state legislation, see Vandall, Undermining Torts'
Policies: Products Liability Legislation, 30 AM. U.L. REv. 673 (1981); see also Note,
Insurance Solution or Tort Reform? - Iowa Joins the Nationwide Examination of
Proposed Product Liability Legislation, 29 DRAKE L. REv. 113 (1979-198o) (Iowa
experience).
74 See Product Liability Risk Retention Act of I98i, Pub. L. No. 97-45, 95 Stat.
949 (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 3901-3903); INTERAGENCY TASK FORCE ON
PRODUCT LIABILITY, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, supra note 72, at VII-15 4 to -167
(1978); Schwartz, The Federal Government and the Product Liability Problem: From
Task-Force Investigation to Decisions by the Administration, 47 U. CIN. L. REv. 573
(1978).
75 See supra p. 1725 & note 21.
76 See, e.g., G. CALABRESI, supra note 7, at 26-31; R. POSNER, supra note I, at
10-12. Calabresi has expressed some doubt that common law adjudication, with its
many moral imperatives, is the best means of achieving efficient results. G. CALABRESI, supra note 7, at 297-99.
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net social losses. 77 Yet the strict liability regime demands no
more; whatever liability rule governs, some accidents that are
too costly to prevent will occur. Strict liability simply requires
the defendant to compensate those harmed by such accidents.
It is sometimes urged that negligence achieves different
-

and better -

results than strict liability, because the de-

fenses of contributory negligence and assumption of risk spur
prospective plaintiffs to avoid accidents that they could prevent more cheaply than could prospective defendants. 78 The
effect of these financial incentives is difficult to determine,
particularly in personal injury cases in which the plaintiffs'
inherent instincts of self-preservation play a central role. But
even if it is established that such incentives make a difference
in plaintiffs' conduct at the margin, there is nothing in a strict
liability system to preclude the adoption of robust defenses, be
they cast in the form of assumption of risk, contributory negligence, 79 or, as I have suggested elsewhere, contributory causation.8 0
Other factors also militate against the efficiency thesis.
Under the negligence regime, standards may be set incorrectly;
thus, parties subject to these standards may be led to take
inadequate or excessive measures for accident prevention. In
addition, a common law court is limited in accident cases to
making some assignment of the plaintiffs losses between the
parties before it. There is no possibility of awarding the plaintiff multiple damages to take into account the likelihood that
a tortfeasor will escape apprehension, and there is no way to
compel the defendant to make his damage payments to an
unrelated third party - a point of no little importance if one
hopes to influence the defendant's behavior without altering
that of the plaintiff. 8 ' Private tort remedies also work fitfully,

77 See, e.g., Buchanan, In Defense of Caveat Emptor, 38 U. CHI. L. REv. 64, 7072 (1970); Posner, supra note 14, at 32-38.

78 R. POSNER, supra note I, at 127-28 (advocating the use of assumption of risk).

79 See Epstein, Defenses and Subsequent Pleas in a System of Strict Liability, 3
J. LEGAL STUD. i65 (1974). But cf. Note, Assumption of Risk and Strict Products
Liability, 95 HARV. L. REv. 872, 881-82, 884-87 (1982) (criticizing the use of classical
assumption of risk both as an independent defense and as a limitation on the use of
a properly tailored contributory negligence defense).
50 See Epstein, Causation and Corrective Justice: A Reply to Two Critics, 8 J.
LEGAL STUD. 477, 493--94 (I979); Epstein, Nuisance Law: Corrective Justice and Its

UtilitarianConstraints, 8 J. LEGAL STUD. 49, 70-73 (i979).
S' On this point, see Tullock, Negligence Again, I INT'L REv. L. & ECON. 51,
57-58 (1981), in which the suggestion (attributed to Earl Thompson) is stated, only
to be rejected as "bizarre."
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if at all, for the protection of resources not owned by any
82
private party.
Incentives, moreover, are not
2. Administrative Costs. the only issue. To be efficient, the liability rules must take
administrative costs into account. But the negligence rule burdens every case with additional issues of categorization and
proof, which naturally add expense to the process. In the end,
as Landes and Posner have suggested, this burden might be
worth bearing if the negligence standard takes considerable
numbers of accident cases out of the legal system. 8 3 In the
absence of useful data about the extent to which the negligence
rule reduces the frequency of suit and increases the administrative costs of actions that are brought, however, all one can
say a priori is that the two effects tend to cancel each other
out. Moreover, the frequency and expense of litigation may
be determined less by substantive standards than by procedural rules. For example, frequency of suit must surely be
influenced strongly by the rule of costs adopted, although it is
unclear whether the American rule (each party pays his own)
or the English rule (winner is reimbursed) stirs up more litigation.8 4 To make any confident predictions about the efficiency of substantive tort rules in isolation from procedural
rules is to push the evidence beyond its decent limits.85
3. Motivation. - Assume, however, that the tort system
is a powerful instrument for social control. What group of
individuals would have the power and the will to use it to
secure allocative advantages? Litigants are not promising candidates for this role; we have not, merely by virtue of moving
from redistribution to allocation, banished the public good
problem, which undermines any self-interested litigant's incen82 Thus, common law remedies are often insufficient to deal with common-pool
problems. Compare Posner, Epstein's Tort Theory: A Critique, 8 J. LEGAL STUD.
457, 467-68 (1979) (suggesting the creation of a tort right of action in fishermen for
poisoning of fish by oil spill), with Epstein, Causation and CorrectiveJustice:A Reply
to Two Critics, supra note 8o, at 502 (pointing out that fishermen will thereby only
be moved to overfish stocks in which they have no property interest and that environmental groups or the government are the real parties in interest, but cannot be
brought in by the common law). Cf. Sweeny, Market Failure, the Common-Pool
Problemi, and Ocean Resource Exploitation, 17 J.L. & EcoN. 179 (1974) (government
regulation of ocean resource exploitation unnecessary, because economic common-pool
problems are absent).
83 Landes & Posner, supra note i, at 875-80.
84 See Shavell, Suit, Settlement, and Trial: A Theoretical Analysis Under Alternative Methods for the Allocation of Legal Costs, ii J. LEGAL STUD. 55, 59 (i982).
85 Certainly, the law and economics school does not neglect the study of administrative questions. See, e.g., Landes & Posner, The Private Enforcement of Law, 4
J. LEGAL STUD. I (1975). What is needed, however, is a general analysis that
intergrates both substantive and procedural issues.
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tive to pursue broad social benefits. 8 6 To be sure, both parties
to an action will want (within the applicable financial constraints) to make the most attractive arguments for their positions, but there is little reason to believe the advocates will
stress the economic arguments (which appear only sporadically
in the cases) in ways that will generate stable and systematic
results.
Nor are judges likely to carry out this program on their
own initiative, given their own clash of views on the substantive issues.8 7 A single vision of an efficient system cannot
emerge from such a haphazard and decentralized process.8 8
Academics are prone to fall into a carefully set trap of their
own making by treating subsidy and efficiency as the only
possible choices. But surely the wellsprings of decision are
more numerous. A sense of the proper judicial role and of
collegial decorum, respect for stare decisis, and deference to
the legislative branch may all play a part in the decision of
cases. Taken together, these other factors are strong enough
to warn us against too hastily reading our own views of legal
problems and social pressures into the common law.
Finally, as was demonstrated in the critique of the redistribution theory, direct regulation is more likely than is the
86 See supra p. 1728.
87 To give one historical example, a great judicial debate arose in England between
Lord Esher, M.R., and Bowen, L.J., over the question whether the assumption of
risk defense was preserved in the Employer's Liability Act of i88o. In Thomas v.
Quartermaine, 18 Q.B.D. 685 (1887), Bowen wrote an opinion that virtually guaranteed the defendant a directed verdict in all industrial accident cases attributable to
patent defects. Later the same year, in Yarmouth v. France, i9 Q.B.D. 647 (1887),
Lord Esher was able to narrow that decision when Bowen was not on the appellate
panel. Esher's approach was vindicated in Smith v. Charles Baker & Sons, i89i
A.C. 325, over the dissent of Lord Bramwell, a staunch believer in the assumption
of risk defense. The difference in orientation is not attributable to any change in
material or social conditions, but to the clash of two very different and very wellformed views of employment relations. The important early American cases on the
assumption of risk defense exhibit similar conflicts. See, e.g., St. Louis Cordage Co.
v. Miller, 126 F. 495 (8th Cir. 1903); id. at 514 (Thayer, J., dissenting).
88 Some theorists do contend that efficient legal rules can emerge from the unconcerted actions of numerous individual litigants. The account posits a kind of natural
selection, by which inefficient rules invite frequent relitigation and breed themselves
into extinction. For the original hypothesis, see Rubin, Why is the Common Law
Efficient?, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 5i, 53 (i977); for a slightly different version, see Priest,
The Common Law Process and the Selection of Efficient Rules, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 65
(1977). It is doubtful that any of these forces, even if they existed, could act rapidly
enough to account for some of the actual shifts observed in common law rules,
especially when judicial ideology is also involved. See supra note 87. A critique of
the Rubin/Priest thesis concludes that the issues can be resolved only by detailed
empirical investigation. See Cooter & Kornhauser, Can Litigation Improve the Law
Without the Help of Judges?, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 139 (x98o).
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common law to create dramatic incentives. Suppose, for example, that a planner of highways were given his choice between two instruments of social control: first, he could determine highway design, speed limits, stop signs and red lights,
suspension of licenses for repeated offenses, fines and imprisonment for drunk driving, and the like; his other option would
be to determine the applicable rules of tort liability for those
accidents that in fact did occur. Can there be any doubt which
alternative he would choose? The direct form of regulation
would strongly influence driving patterns; one need think only
of the countless local battles over whether a stop sign should
be installed near a schoolhouse or a stoplight at a busy intersection. The matter of liability rules would appear in contrast
almost as a detail, relevant perhaps to the disposition of individual cases. Indeed, it is not surprising that virtually all
nonlawyers are ignorant of the doctrinal dispute between negligence and strict liability and do not know to which system
they refer when they appeal in everyday language to "fault"
as a criterion of liability. The stakes simply are not high
enough to spur individuals to master common law rules before
the occurrence of an accident. Yet efficiency theorists continue
to base their disputes over the desirability of the Hand formula8 9 on the presupposition that fundamental tort decisions
are made wholly in a common law context. In truth, explicit
statutes and regulations play a central part in many tort cases;
if they do not dictate the result, they surely constrain the
analysis.
III. CONTRACT
The basic themes of the previous discussion recur in the
law of contracts. Here too the constant temptation is to ascribe
social importance to any doctrine that commands close attention by the courts. But again, intensive judicial involvement
proves only that it is doctrinally difficult to apply a particular
rule to marginal cases. Consider the attention lavished on
offer and acceptance by post, a point with little conceivable
social or economic impact, which nevertheless generated a
large body of nineteenth century case law and produced an
outpouring of scholarly controversy.90 Similarly, few decisions
89 Posner, for one, considers the Hand formula, see United States v. Carroll
Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, r73 (2d Cir. 1947), so fundamental - a "unifying
perspective in which to view all tort law," R. POSNER, TORT LAW 3 (1982) - that
he devotes the opening chapter of his new casebook to its exposition. Id. ch. I (1982).
90 See, e.g., materials collected in F. KESSLER & G. GILMORE, CONTRACTS 26790 (2d ed. 1970).
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will turn on the differences between the objective and subjective theories of contract, however much the conceptual niceties
of the topic may have divided Williston and Corbin. 9 1
Treatment of the basic doctrine of consideration illustrates
this tendency to inflate the social importance of common law
rules. As a measure of contract formation, consideration is
often set in opposition to promissory estoppel. The central
doctrinal dispute is whether a promise not grounded in a
bargain should be enforced when the promisee relies to his
detriment. Another key academic debate concerns inadequacy
of consideration, a doctrine that refers to the willingness of a
court to set aside or otherwise adjust manifestly one-sided
agreements and that Horwitz has credited with the traditional
function of ensuring the "substantive equality of the ex92
change. "
A. Considerationand Estoppel
Much of the internal logic of contract law is devoted to
defining appropriate spheres for the operation of strict consideration doctrine and promise-based reliance. The debate has
great intrinsic fascination, for it provides a window on important questions of jurisprudence. Consideration is a narrow,
cautious doctrine reflecting the legal system's determination to
define and control a class of enforceable agreements. It has
been called "[t]he balance-wheel of the great machine" 93 and
has been ranked with offer and acceptance as part of the
94
"indivisible trinity" of doctrines that organize contract law.
Promissory estoppel, on the other hand, is characterized by its
advocates as a welcome, if belated, recognition and mitigation
of the undue harshness and uncompromising technicality that
95
consideration imposes on the common law.
There are again two threshold questions relevant to an
assessment of claims that a given rule is economically efficient
or that it benefits a dominant social class. First, what proportion of transactions are treated differently by the two principles? Second, what potential does the choice of rules have
to enhance overall output or to redistribute wealth? It is not
91 See G. GILMORE, THE DEATH OF CONTRACT 57-65 (1974) (discussing the split
between Williston and Corbin, with particular reference to the Restatement).
92 M. HORWiTZ, supra note 2, at 167.
93 G. GILMORE, supra note 91, at 18.
94 Hamson, The Reform of Consideration, 54 LAW Q. REv. 233, 234 (1938); see
also Fuller, Consideration and Form, 41 COLUM. L. REV. 799, 823 (i941) (linking

consideration with "the principle of'private autonomy").
95 G. GILMORE, supra note 91, at 17-34, 64-77.
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my purpose to take sides in this perennial debate, but to
counsel that the stakes involved in the choice of rules are so
into
small that it is pointless to convert the doctrinal 9dispute
6
an essay on distributional or allocative programs.
Whether or not the doctrine of promissory estoppel is accepted, the requirement of consideration will be satisfied as 9a7
matter of course in nearly every contractual transaction.
Consideration is built into the definition of most standard
contracts. A sale is defined, for example, as a transfer of
ownership of goods in exchange for a money consideration
- the price. Contracts for hire, for barter, for employment,
for a loan with interest, for insurance, or for partnership necessarily import consideration. Indeed, human self-interest is
so persistent that most promises falling outside these wellestablished categories will also be supported by consideration;
true gifts are not often made outside family or charitable settings. The doctrine of promissory estoppel, therefore, is relegated to influencing marginal family arrangements - in which
96 Atiyah is one of many scholars who assert that the general reliance principle
reflects larger social and economic trends:
Reliance-based liabilities are still more hostile to the values of free choice.
As soon as liabilities come to be placed upon a person in whom another has
reposed trust or reliance, even though there is no explicit promise or agreement
to bear that liability, the door is opened to a species of liability which does not
depend upon a belief in individual responsibility and free choice. Not only is
the party relied upon held liable without his promise, but the party relying is
relieved from the consequences of his own actions. The values involved in this
type of liability are therefore closely associated with a paternalist social philosophy, and redistributive economic system. This book is not the place for a full
exploration of these questions, but it claims at least to offer some explanations
for the origins of the present traditional approach to promissory and contractual
obligations.
P. AT1YAH, THE RiSE AND FALL OF FREEDOM OF CONTRACT 6-7 (1979).
The passage seems odd in at least one respect. The traditional forms of promissory
estoppel were designed to expand the scope of contractual liability beyond the point
at which the doctrine of consideration had left it. In that regard, the doctrine is best
understood as an expansion of freedom of contract, against which consideration is an
implicit limitation. The larger implications hinted at by Atiyah follow only if reliance
removes the need for a promise. But then one would be talking about not the inner
workings of contract law, but a total repudiation of the contract principle. This shift
would be similar to elimination of the causation requirement in tort, a massive change
beyond the boundaries of traditional common law debates.
97 Promissory estoppel is not available at all in fully executory contracts; in this
important class of cases, therefore, the consideration tests must always be satisfied.
For this reason alone, Gilmore errs in his assertion that the "contradictory propositions" of consideration and reliance cannot comfortably coexist: "in the end one must
swallow the other up." Gilmore, supra note 9i, at 61. Atiyah also seems reluctant
to enforce fully executory agreements. P. ATIYAH, supra note 96, at 1-7, 754-64.
For a criticism of the logical problems in Atiyah's division of the types of contracts
and in the arguments based on that division, see Eisenberg, The Bargain Principle
and Its Limits, 95 HARv. L. REv. 741, 785 n.121 (1982).
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the law of wills and its demands for formality exert a heavy
influence - and some fringe commercial transactions. Without the corrective of promissory estoppel in these borderline
cases, the insistence upon consideration might introduce a jarring element into contractual relations, and the variance between legal doctrine and commercial practice might set traps
for the unwary. Even here, however, promissory estoppel may
be less significant than social pressures in influencing commercial behavior. How often, for instance, would a bank try to
collect a forgiven interest payment, stating as its sole reason
the want of consideration?
The consideration debate is also of little consequence from
the perspective of wealth redistribution and allocative efficiency. This point is amply demonstrated by the potential for
evasion. Suppose, for the moment, that the rules of contract
formation are of vital social concern. What is the real bite of
a consideration requirement? In most cases, a simple insertion
of nominal consideration, or an elementary restructuring of
contractual terms, allows the parties to escape whatever restrictions the law may impose. Parties can, as it were, contract
out of most of first-year Contracts. Consideration has, for just
this reason, been viewed as a matter less of judicial regulation
than of "form," like the requirement of a writing or seal. 98 It
therefore follows that parties involved in any important, recurrent contractual arrangement will practice the standard
evasions as a matter of course, at a miniscule cost per transaction.
One must thus conclude that the two rules of contract
formation differ chiefly in matters of style and nuance. These
contrasts are hardly sufficient to achieve substantial social or
economic impact. In the commercial context, the rules' effect
on efficiency is apt to be dwarfed by a host of other institutional characteristics, such as the degree of cohesion, custom,
and trust between persons and within industries. The English
have maintained a thriving commercial system for many years
without fully endorsing the doctrine of promissory estoppe19 9
or, for that matter, even a doctrine clearly permitting actions

98 For a discussion of the relative importance of the substantive and evidentiary
aspects of the doctrine, see Fuller, supra note 94.
99 See Jorden v. Money, io Eng. Rep. 868, 882 (H.L. 1854) (establishing rule that
estoppel applies only given misrepresentation of an existing fact); see also Maddison
v. Alderson, 8 App. Cas. 467, 473 (1883) (later statement). See generally M. FURISTON, CHESHIRE & FIFOOT's LAW OF CONTRACT 89-91 (9th ed. 1976) (summarizing
the law).
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by third-party beneficiaries of contracts. 10 0 Nor does the articulation of principles for marginal cases yield distributional
consequences; most commercial transactions and nearly all
family transactions are between parties of the same class.
However one tries to spin a story about the larger social
consequences of this persistent doctrinal tension, it will remain
a story, and no more.
B. Adequacy of Consideration
It is important at the outset to clarify the nature of the
doctrinal dispute about the need for adequate consideration.
No one has ever contended that all contracts should be enforced simply because parties entered into them. At issue,
rather, are the precise grounds on which enforcement or rescission of a contract should be ordered. Historically, all courts
have agreed that it is improper to take advantage of infants
or obvious incompetents and that the presumption of consent
in a contract with a competent person is vitiated by duress,
fraud, and, in many contexts, simple misrepresentation. The
only issue with respect to adequacy of consideration is
whether, apart from particular proof of these grounds, an
agreement may be set aside because of the gross disparity
between the value of the thing contracted for and its price.
Invalidation of contracts on the ground of inadequate consideration might be regarded as an important aspect of contractual doctrine, because it authorizes judicial limitations on
the process of voluntary exchange by demanding that bargains
meet independent standards of fairness. It is this theme to
which the writings of Horwitz and Atiyah refer.' 0 ' But what
percentage of commercial transactions would be affected by
adoption of a rule that permitted investigation into the adequacy of consideration as such? Surely all transactions made
in organized markets at competitive prices must go unquestioned, for to hold one of these exchanges suspect would be to
strike down all identical transactions. Even standard monopoly practices -

especially those authorized by the state -

are

beyond challenge by any doctrine requiring adequacy of consideration. Strict threshold conditions must be satisfied before
inadequacy even becomes a litigated issue. Cases involving
seamen, dependent widows, and rapid fluctuations in market
100Tweddle v. Atkinson, 121 Eng. Rep. 762, 764 (Q.B. i86i) ("[N]o stranger to
the consideration can take advantage of a contract, although made for his benefit.").
See generally M. FURMSTON, supra note 99, at 436-38.
101 See P. ATIYAH, supra note 96, at x67-77; M. HoRWrTz, supra note 2, at i6i-
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prices due to wartime conditions contain serious intrinsic difficulties, but do
not begin to touch the bulk of commercial
0 2
transactions.'

The dispute over the adequacy-of-consideration doctrine is
better understood as an honest difference of opinion on how
best to tackle the twin problems of fraud and incompetence in
the contracting process. Those who assert that inadequacy of
price is not a ground on which to refuse enforcement of a
contract do not necessarily deny that such inadequacy is evidence of fraud; in the absence of indications of donative intent,
disparity in exchange may well signal that something has gone
amiss in the process of contract formation. While refusal to
inquire into the adequacy of consideration may increase the
likelihood that some fraud will escape detection, adoption of
the inadequacy doctrine increases the risk that some legitimate
agreements will be set aside. There is no definitive balance to
be struck between these two types of error, and the vacillation
in the case law, both within and across historical periods, is
but a reflection of the delicate judgments that must be made. 103
It is doubtful that either rule has any strong allocational advantages over the other, and it is quite improbable that the
uncertain course charted in the cases provides evidence of any
major historical transformation. The common elements of the
two approaches predominate over their differences; there is
simply no systematic distinction from which social consequences could flow.
102 Horwitz quotes a passage from John Adams' Autobiography as evidence of the
i8th century position that it is "natural, immutable Law that the Buyer ought not to
take advantage of the sellers Necessity, to purchase at too low a Price." M. HoRwiTz,
supra note 2, at 66. However, Adams' illustration - a man who must sell his
worldly possessions to one possible buyer in order to stay out of jail - is hardly the
stuff of routine commercial transactions.
103 Professor Simpson demonstrates that divisions of opinion on the proper approach to inadequacy of consideration predated the nineteenth century and persisted
during it. Simpson, The Horwitz Thesis and the History of Contracts, 46 U. CHI. L.
REV. 533, 561-62 (1979). This historical finding is consistent with the claim that
choosing an adequacy-of-consideration rule does not necessarily reflect a profound
ideological stance. See also P. ATiYAH, supra note 96, at 69-77 (noting that, while
courts would sometimes ignore the issue of adequacy of consideration, general trend
in i8th century was toward examining substance of bargain); id. at 171-72 (neither
equity courts nor the legislature would tolerate contracts by "unscrupulous speculators"
who preyed on "common sailorfs]"); Epstein, Unconscionability: A Critical Reappraisal, 18 J.L. & ECON. 293, 304 (1975) (advocating setting aside certain municipal
bond purchases entered into by prisoners recently returned from the Vietnam War);
cf. Eisenberg, supra note 97, at 754-63 (excepting marine salvage, medical rescue,
and similar distress cases from the general rationales offered in support of enforcing
contracts to the full, and advocating the application of unconscionability doctrine to
reduce awards). Commentators starting with very different ideological assumptions
thus reach the same results in similar individual cases.
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C. Direct Controls
In contract law, as in the law of torts, the impact of a rule
will often depend on its specificity of reference. A broad common law doctrine of unconscionability that proceeds on a caseby-case basis is not of major significance. No matter how
attractive the precept of unconscionability is as a jurisprudential matter, the number of transactions that can be reached
and controlled is too small to have social impact, and the
reluctance of courts to review countless agreements is too
strong. A more focused judicial intervention, however, can
have substantial effects. Thus, when a court invalidates or
upholds a due-on-sale clause in a standard residential mortgage, in effect it decides whether a lender is entitled (albeit
only upon sale) to cut the enormous losses that have resulted
from long-term, low-interest mortgages during recent years of
sustained, but unanticipated inflation. To analyze the decision's possible redistributive results, one must, of course, determine whether individual homeowners and bank shareholders are drawn from the same social class. Similarly, inquiry
into allocative effects must ask whether the devices available
to lenders in future transactions - shorter loan periods, variable-rate interest, shared-appreciation mortgages - will allow
them to protect themselves against the perceived hazard without losing their natural markets. Although such an empirical
inquiry lies outside the scope of this essay, this example illustrates that a single decision on a narrow question of law
addressed to a determinate class of firms may have profound
consequences that far exceed the doctrinal subtlety of the subject.
As in the field of tort law, the greatest allocative and
distributional effects can be expected from legislative and regulatory intervention - especially intervention that operates in
derogation of freedom of contract. Antitrust laws, if strictly
enforced, can impose major restrictions upon the freedom to
enter certain kinds of contracts: sale of a business to a competitor, price-fixing agreements, and many,types of arrangements with customers and franchisees, including tie-ins and
exclusive dealing relationships. The stakes in this area of the
law are so high that the subject has generated its own specialized bar and individual court decisions become focal points
for major legislative initiatives. 10 4 Similarly, antidiscrimina104 See, e.g., Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720 (,977) (denying standing
to indirect purchasers attempting to sue to recover passed-through costs resulting from
antitrust violation). Legislation to overturn the Illinois Brick result and to provide
a cause of action was immediately introduced in both houses of Congress. See S.

HeinOnline -- 95 Harv. L. Rev. 1750 1981-1982

1982]

COMMON LAW RULES

1751

tion laws mark an enormous departure from the traditional
common law principle that employment contracts are formed
at will. Today, the process of hiring, promoting, and firing is
no longer constrained solely by business needs and the employer's interest in maintaining a good reputation among potential employees. Modern employment decisions must be
tested against a "for cause" standard that bars consideration
of such factors as race, sex, national origin, and age. 10 5 The
ability to contract out of this social norm is decisively barred
by statute: no mere peppercorn will do. Yet what firm will
choose to go out of business to escape the sting of regulation?
Instead it will establish new hiring standards, new personnel
offices, and a vastly expanded legal department, none of which
would be required if consideration were jettisoned tomorrow.
IV. CONCLUSION

In the course of this Article, I have examined a number of
common law rules solely to determine whether their social and
economic consequences are a fruitful subject for further investigation. Based on this examination, I have concluded that
they frequently are not, and that legal scholars of whatever
persuasion must exercise considerable care in choosing suitable
objects for their inquiries. The point here does not go to the
merits of any issue. One may regard large nineteenth century
industrialists as the architects of a golden age, as simple robber
barons, or perhaps as a bit of both. But whatever view ultimately prevails, the general common law rules of tort and
contract constituted only a tiny portion of the legal turf over
which their battles, or those of any generation, were fought.
My argument is not that the common law does not have
enormous intrinsic worth both as a system of thought and as
a minimum condition for social order. The true lesson is that
the legal points so troublesome to both judges and lawyers in
a common law setting need not mirror the pressing issues of
society at large.
1874, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978); H.R. 11,942, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (i978). Neither
of these bills was enacted, and a similar measure proposed to the following Congress,
see S. 300, 9 6th Cong., ist Sess. § 2 (i979), also failed. California did pass a statute
affirming the existence of a cause of action for indirect purchasers under state antitrust
law. See CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 1675o(a) (West Supp. 1982).
105 The foremost restriction is, of course, that of title VII. See Civil Rights Act
of 1964, § 703, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241, 255 (1964) (codified as amended at
42 U.S.C. § 2oooe-2 (1976)). The litigation under title VII has applied the standard
widely. See, e.g., International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324,
348 (1977); Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747, 763 (1976); Albemarle
Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 418 (i975).
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